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In the next few years, the geographic scope
of the market for individual banks will increase
sharply with the growing use of electronic
funds transfer mechanisms. The costs and the
inconvenience of using banks based in distant
locations will decline. Inevitably, the change
in the technology of payments will enlarge the
market for major banks across the national
borders; u.s. banks will find it easier to at-
tract foreign customers and foreign banks will
find it easier to attract U.S. customers and in-
ternational banking will expand.
Currently over one-hundred U.S. banks have
foreign branches or offices; five have sizable
branch networks. More than 60 foreign banks
have set up one or more branches in the United
States and several have established branch net-
works in California. The assets of U.S. banks
operating abroad are about 15 percent of do-
mestic U.S. bank assets, although 70 percent of
the foreign assets involve off-shore transactions
in dollars. Foreign banks now account for
nearly 7 percent of bank assets in the United
States.
This article presents two theoretical ap-
proaches for viewing the phenomenon of inter-
national banking. One approach, based on
international trade theory, emphasizes compara-
tive costs of banking in different countries and
"barriers to trade" which prevent costs from
being equalized. The second approach, based
on industrial organization theory, assesses the
market structure of banks in different countries
through comparisons in mark-ups orspreadsbe-
tween borrowing and lending rates.
Trade TheoryApproach
One set of hypotheses about the competitive
position of banks in different countries is based
on theories of international trade. Thus, bank-
ing will be most substantial in those countries
which have a comparative advantage in produc-
ing bank products in those countries' services.
Imagine that there were free trade in money
and in loans, convenience (e.g., bank office lo-
cation) would be much less important to bor-
rowers and depositors in choosing among
competing banks. The market share of the
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more efficient banks would increase. Ifthe less
efficient banks set their interest rates to main-
tain their market share, their profit rates and
the rate ofgrowth of their capital would decline.
The efficient, low-cost banks would be able to
attract capital and increase their market shares,
while the higher-cost banks-and the banks
most susceptible to loss charge-offs-would in-
cur declines in market shares.
Several questions arise when competition
among banks is examined in an international
context - as an international industry, with
firms based in different countries competing
in the same market or in overlapping segmentsof various national markets. One is the com-
parative cost of production of banks based in
different countries, which concerns the relative
efficiency of banks operating in different coun-
tries; this is the standard international-trade
question of comparative advantage. Answering
this question requires a model of the inputs, out-
puts, and the production function in banking. A
related question involves the impact of national
regulation on the costs of producing bank serv-
ices; in part the rapid growth of offshore bank-
ing results from efforts to circumvent the costs
of national regulation. A final question is
whether firms based in some countries have ad-
vantages in owning banks overseas-the tradi-
tional international-investment question.
One analogy to competition in international
banking is provided by the international auto-
mobile industry. Currently about 15 compa-
nies supply the world market for autos. Most
countries import autos. Trade in autos is ex-
tensive, even among the producing coun-
tries; the Swedes buy many Fiats and the Ital-
ians buy some Volvos. Over the last 20 years,
competition in national and international mar-
kets has led to a sharp decline in the number
of automobile firms. Within the United States,
old-line firms such as Studebaker, Packard,
Hudson, and Willys have disappeared, as have
Citroen, Sunbeam, Audi, Simca, Wolsey, and
Maserati abroad. It is a truism that the defunct
firms have not been able, given the level of mar-
ket prices, to earn the profits necessary to main-
tain their capital position.
Banks face a similar problem-if they are
less efficient than their competitors, they are
less able to acquire the capital necessary to fi-
nance their expansion and maintain their mar-
ket share. But if they raise their selling prices
to realize a higher rate of return, their market
share may fall.
The reduction in the number of firms noted
in the world automobile industry has already
occurred in most national markets for banks.
In the Netherlands banking is dominated by two
firms; in France, by four firms; in Canada,
Great Britain, and Japan by about ten. Within
the United States, in contrast, the combination
of anti-trust legislation and limits on branch
banking across state boundaries has resulted
in much less concentration.
International trade in money is less exten-
sive than international trade in autos, even
though the apparent costs of trade in automo-
biles are larger. The national markets for
bank products are segmented by the costs of
using the foreign-exchange market. Segmenta-
tion of national money markets also may re-
sult from the inconvenience of using distant
banks. As these costs fall further, competitive
pressures should insure that buyers of bank
products and users of bank services shift to the
more efficient banks, even if national borders
must be crossed.
Industrial Organization Approach
Another set of hypotheses about the compe-
titive potential of banks is based on industrial
organization studies. Profits and the numbers of
firms are inversely related; the smaller the num-
beroffirms in the industry, the higher their profit
rates. The implication is that banks based in
countries with high concentration ratios would
be more profitable-and better able to satisfy
capital expansion needs-than those in coun-
tries with lower concentration ratios. Thus the
margins ofbanks-the spread between the inter-
est rates they receive on loans and the interest
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rates they pay on deposits-would be higher in
the countries in which the concentration ratios
are high. High margins provide the necessary
conditionfor high rates ofprofit, but not the suf-
ficient condition; the less extensive competition
may have led to higher wage rates and costs and
less pressure for efficiency. To some extent, dif-
ferences in margins may reflect differences in
costs of reserve requirements.
A comparison of the efficiency of commer-
cial banks in several countries requires an an-
swer to the question, "What do commercialbanks produce?" The experts do not agree on
an answer, in part because the output of banks,
in contrast to that of auto companies, is not
visible.' In the absence of clarity about the in-
puts and outputs, comparisons of efficiency
across national frontiers are likely to be futile.
Commercial banks are one class of a family
of financial intermediaries. All financial inter-
mediaries perform similar functions - they
issue liabilities to primary lenders, largelyhouse-
holds, and use the funds to buy the securities
issued by primary borrowers, largely firms and
governments. The interest income paid by the
borrowers exceeds that on the liabilities issued
by the financial intermediaries.
The liabilities issued by financial intermedi-
aries differ from those issued by primary bor-
rowers in several respects; for instance, they are
more liquid, in that they can be more readily
exchanged into money at a fixed price. In ad-
dition, the liabilities issued by financial inter-
mediaries are less subject to default risk, since
intermediaries hold a diversified group of pri-
mary securities. Morover, the liabilities issued
by some financial intermediaries are guaran-
teed by the government. Finally, the liabilities
issued by financial intermediaries sometimes
have attached associated services: life insurance
policies provide a fixed payment contingent on
death, while annuity and pension policies pro-
vide a variable payment contingent on living.
Demand deposits are used for money payments.
Financial intermediaries are grouped by the
unique types of financial liabilities they pro-
duce. Commercial banks produce demand de-
posits-by definition any institution which pro-
duces demand deposits is a commercial bank.
At any time the size of the commercial bank
sector relative to the size of every other type
of financial intermediary depends on the pri-
mary lenders' demand for the risk, return, and
service attributes of liabilities of each type of
intermediary. The reserve requirements ap-
plied to commercial banks provide an upper
limit on the volume of the liabilities at any
time, given the volume of their reserves cre-
ated by the central bank. Moreover, the re-
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serve requirements reduce the interest that
banks can pay on their deposits, since they
constrain the interest income earned by banks.
Banks and non-banks acquire similar types of
assets, although not necessarily in the same pro-
portions. The interest rates that each type of
intermediary can pay on its liabilities will-in
the absence of regulatory constraints-depend
on how successful it has been in acquiring as-
sets whose returns are high related to their
risks.
Each financial intermediary performs two
different functions. On the one hand, each
intermediary sells its liabilities and buys money;
on the other hand, each buys loans and sells
money. The more successful the intermediary is
in selling liabilities, the larger volume ofinterest-
bearing assets it can acquire. Intermediaries
in marketing their liabilities attempt to optimize
the risk-return aspects of their assets.
For financial intermediaries as a whole, the
acquisition of liabilities of primary borrowers
must equal the sale of liabilities to primary lend-
ers. But this statement is not necessarily true
for each bank, or for each life insurance com-
pany, nor is it true for banks as a group or for
life insurance companies as a group, or for any
other sub-set of financial institutions. At any
time, some commercial banks may be more suc-
cessful in selling liabilities than in finding at-
tractive loans; these banks can "sell" or lend
their excess money to other banks. If some
banks have an excess supply of deposits, then
other banks must have an excess supply of as-
sets or loans. Transactions among banks would
clear the market.
Once an individual bank has sold an addi-
tional deposit to a primary saver, it compares
the prospective return and risk from acquiring
additional primary securities with the return and
the risk from lending to other banks. Most fi-
nancial institutions specialize in either selling
deposits or in buying loans. The implication is
that there are significant economies of scale in
grouping the liability transactions and the asset
transactions in one institution.
Nevertheless the loans of some banks exceedrec:eif:l1s :[rom sale ofdeposits to primarylenders,
their funds obtained borrowing from
otherbanks and other large lenders; such banks
are known as wholesale banks. Specialization
banksinthe function bea
function of and of restrictions on
branching; thelargewholesalebanks arelocated
in the major cities where most of the large bor-
rowers also are based. more
the wholesale banks may have an advan-
tage in information about
borrowers which other banks find it
At moment, each bankcompares there-
turn available on additional primary
assets with the return from selling deposits to
other banks. The interest rate at which de-
are traded among banks can be used as
a transfer price to determine the distribution of
the gross income of the bank between its two
activities.
In fact, at any moment a family of transfer
prices exists; these prices differ by maturity-
one on Federal funds, one on short-term cer-
tificates of another on cer-
tificates of deposit, one on longer-term govern-
ment bonds.
2 Moreover, theprices for each ma-
may differ in the foreign money markets
and intheexternalcurrencymarket,because risk
attributes for foreign and domestic securities
differ.
3Thebankmustdecide which interest rates
are most relevant for the internal transfer price.
Conclusion
The two approaches outlined in this paper
view commercialbanking as an international in-
dustry. Industrial organization theory suggests
that inferences about the relative efficiency of
banks based in different countries may be ob-
tained from a comparison of loan-deposit
spreads. The difference between the interest
rates paid on bank liabilities and the interest
rates earned on new assets covers the banks'
costs and provides them with the profits neces-
sary to finance their expansion. Trade theory,
however, suggests that free trade in money
would cause depositors to shift funds to those
banks payingthe highest deposit rates, andcause
borrowers to shift business to the banks charg-
ing the lowest interest rates. Banks with the
higher markups would be forced out ofbusiness,
eliminating observed differences in spreads
across countries..
The persistence of very large differences in
such spreads would indicate that "barriers to
trade" in money exist, permitting assessment of
the underlying efficiency of each country's
banks. These differences would be independent
of inflation or recession or changes in exchange
rates, because interest rates paid on liabilities
and assets would be equally affected. The trade
theory and industrial organization approaches,
thus, are complementary ways of viewing the
phenomenon of international banking. In a
world of integrated financial markets, an analy-
sis of banking based on underlying cost differ-
ences could be more appropriate for future
research efforts than one based on trends in
lending flows or numbers of banking offices.
FOOTNOTES
1. See W. F. Mackara, "What Do Banks Produce?" Monthly
Review. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, May 1975, pp.
70-75.
2. Note the choice of the relevant trar.sfer price is indepen-
dent of how much banking risk the firm should acquire-
that is, to what extent the bank should mismatch the ma-
turities of its assets and liabilities. Once the bank decides
on the appropriate mismatch, then it should trade securi-
ties whenever the market spreads differfrom those it deems
offer the best risk-return combination.
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3. In a world without transaction costs and political risk
neutrality, yields on assets denominated in one currency
would differ from those on assets denominated in other
currancies bythe anticipated rate ofchange in the exchange
rate; all yields in one currency would be a simple transfor-
mation of those in every other currency. Bid-ask spreads
would be everywhere equal. In the real world, these spreads
are not equal. The bank must choose between the transfer
price in the domestic market, and that in the foreign
market.